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Abstract—Intrusion detection is a topic of interest in current
scenario. Statistical IDS overcomes many pitfalls present in
signature based IDS. Statistical IDS uses models such as NB, C4.5
etc for classification to detect Intrusions. Multiclass Support
Vector Machine is able to perform multiclass classification. This
paper shows the performance of MSVM (1-versus-1, 1-versusmany and Error Correcting Output Coding (ECOC)) and it’s
variants for statistical NBIDS. This paper explores the
performance of MSVM for various categories of attacks.
Keywords-NBIDS; KDDCUP99; MSVM; Intrusion Detection;
Kernel Function; RBF.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Intrusion detection (ID) is the processing procedure of
identification and response to the action of malicious use
computers and network resources [1]. Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) are computer programs that tries to perform
intrusion detection by comparing observable behavior against
suspicious patterns, preferably in real-time. Intrusion is
primarily network based activity [2]. The primary aim of
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) is to protect the availability,
confidentiality and integrity of critical networked information
systems.
II.

detection has low false positive rate, but unable to detect novel
attacks. It is more accurate but it lacks the ability to identify the
presence of intrusions that do not fit a pre-defined signature,
resulting not adaptive [4]. Misuse detection discovers attacks
based on patterns extracted from known intrusions [5].
Statistical based IDS: Statistical detection techniques assume
that all intrusive activities are necessarily anomalous. This
means that if we could establish a "normal activity profile" for
a system, we could, in theory, flag all system states varying
from the established profile by statistically significant amounts
as intrusion attempts. Anomaly detection is based on modeling
the normal activity of the computer system. Unfortunately, the
acquisition of profiles of normal activity is not an easy task.
The audit records used to produce the profiles of normal
activity may contain traces of intrusions leading to
misdetections, and also activities of legitimate users often
deviate from their normal profile as modeled, leading to high
false alarm rates [6].
C.
x

TECHNIQUES OF IDS

A. Host-Based IDS and Network Based IDS
IDS can be classified based on which events they monitor,
how they collect information and how they deduce from the
information that an intrusion has occurred. IDSs that operates
on a single workstation are known as host intrusion detection
system (HIDS), A HBIDS adds a targeted layer to security to
particularly vulnerable or essential systems, it monitors audit
trails and system logs for suspicious behaviors [3] while A
network-based IDS monitors network traffic for particular
network segments or devices and analyzes network, transport,
and application protocols to identify suspicious activity.
B. Misuse and Anomaly detection Techniques
Misuse detection uses the “signatures” of known attacks to
identify a matched activity as an attack instance. Misuse

Network Attack in IDS
Denial of service[20] (DOS): In this type of attack an
attacker makes some computing or memory resources
too busy or too full to handle legitimate requests, or
denies legitimate users access to a machine. Examples
are Apache2, Back, Land, Mail bomb, SYN Flood,
Ping of death, Process table, Smurf, Teardrop.

x

Remote to user[7] (R2L): In this type of attack an
attacker who does not have an account on a remote
machine sends packets to that machine over a network
and exploits some vulnerability to gain local access as
a user of that machine. Examples are Dictionary,
Ftp_write, Guest, Imap, Named, Phf, Send mail,
Xlock.

x

User to root (U2R): In this type of attacks an attacker
starts out with access to a normal user account on the
system and is able to exploit system vulnerabilities to
gain root access to the system. Examples are Eject,
Loadmodule, Ps, Xterm, Perl, and Fdformat.

x

Probing: In this type of attacks an attacker scans a
network of computers to gather information or find
known vulnerabilities. An attacker with a map of
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machines and services that are available on a network
can use this information to look for exploits. Examples
are Ipsweep, Mscan, Saint, Satan, and Nmap.
III.

.This is a
Subject to
quadratic programming (QP) problem. To solve it, we have to
introduce Lagrangian:

SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE

The theory of Support Vector Machine (SVM) is from
statistics which is proposed by Vapnik. The basic principle of
SVM is finding the optimal linear hyperplane in the feature
space that maximally separates the two target classes. For
linearly separable and non-separable data, it can be translated
into quadratic programming (QP) and can get an only limit
point. In the case of non-linear, SVM can map the input to a
high-dimensional feature space by using non-linear mapping
and then the linear hyperplane can be found [8].

According to the Kuhn-Tucher conditions, we obtain

With the Lagrange multiplier
for all i =1, 2… k. So the
dual
of
equation
(1)
is:

A. SVM classification model
The basic principle of SVM is finding the optimal linear
hyperplane in the feature space that maximally separates the
two target classes. The hyperplane which separates the two
classes can be defined as:
For this problem, we also have the complement condition
Here xk is a group of samples:

.
So the optimal separating hyperplane is the following indicator
function:

, and k is
the number of styles; n is the input dimension; w and b are
nonzero constants [9] [10].
We can obtain the value of vector Ȧ from (3).
C. Non-linear separable model
In the non-linear problem, it can be solved by extending
the original set of variables x in a high dimensional feature
space with the map ĭ. suppose that input vector x ȯ Rd is
transformed to feature vector ĭ (x) by a map ĭ: RdĺH, then
we can find a function K (R’, R’) ĺ R that satisfies condition K
(xi, xj) = ĭ(xi).ĭ(xj) , so we can replace the inner-product
between two vectors (xi , xj )by K (xi, xj) and the QP problem
expressed by (4) becomes:

Figure1. The optimal linear hyperplane: SV=(support vectors)

B.

Linearly separable model
Assume a training set:

The optimal separating hyperplane (5) can be rewritten as:

, k is the
number of samples. Thus, the problem can be described as:
Minimize

(1)
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D.

Multiclass support vector machine on non-linear
separable model
Support vector machines are formulated for two class
problems. But because support vector machines employ direct
decision functions, an extension to multiclass problems is not
straightforward. There are roughly four types of support vector
machines that handle multiclass problems. But we use here
only three for our research work (1-vs-many), pair wise
coupling (1-vs-1), and error-correcting output coding (ECOC)
[11].
x

One per class (OPC) also known as “one against
others.” OPC trains K binary classifiers, each of which
separates one class from the other (K - 1) classes.
Given a point X to classify, the binary classifier with
the largest output determines the class of X.

x

The Pair wise coupling (PWC) constructs K (K-1)/2
pair wise binary classifiers. The classifying decision is
made by aggregating the outputs of the pairwise
classifiers

x

Error-correcting output coding (ECOC) [19] [12] used
to reduce classification error by exploiting the
redundancy of the coding scheme. ECOC employs a
set of binary classifiers assigned with codeword’s such
that the Hamming distance between each pair is far
enough apart to enable good error correction.
IV.

92.05%, 90.65% & 92.00% for one-vs.-one, one-vs.-many &
ECOC MSVM methods respectively.
V.

The Evaluation Metrics mainly used following steps to
evaluate the performance of classifier:
x

True positives: The true positives (TP) and true
negatives (TN) are correct classifications.

x

False positive: A false positive (FP) occurs when the
outcome is incorrectly predicted as yes (or positive)
when it is actually no (negative).

x

False negative: A false negative (FN) occurs when the
outcome is incorrectly predicted as negative when it is
actually positive.

x

Recall: The percentage of the total relevant documents
in a database retrieved by search. If user knew that
there were 1000 relevant documents in a database and
his search retrieved 100 of these relevant documents,
his recall would be 10%.
Recall =TP/ (TP+FN)

x

Precision: The percentage of relevant documents in
relation to the number of documents retrieved. If
search retrieves 100 documents and 20 of these are
relevant, then precision is 20%.
Precision=TP / (TP+FP)

DATASET AND EXPERIMENTS

The KDD Cup 1999 uses a version of the data on which the
1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program was
performed. Each instance in the KDD Cup 1999 datasets
contains 41 features that describe a connection. Features 1-9
stands for the basic features of a packet, 10-22 for content
features, 23-31 for traffic features and 32-41 for host based
features. There are 38 different types attack in training and test
data together and these types of attack fall into four main
categories: probe, denial of service (DoS), remote to local
(R2L) and user to root (U2R) [14]. We have taken 26 total no
of classes to classification.
TABLE I.

EVALUATION MATRICS

x

F-measure: The harmonic mean of precision and recall
F = 2 * Recall * Precision / (Recall + Precision)

The true positive rate is TP divided by the total number of
positives, which are TP + FN. The false positive rate is FP
divided by the total number of negatives, FP + TN. ROC area
in ROC analysis we plot true positive ratio (tpr) against, false
positive ratio (fpr).The overall success rate is the number of
correct classifications divided by the total number of
classifications:

DATASET

Dataset

Train Records

Test Records

KDD CUP99

48,984,31(4.9 million)

3,11,029(0.3 million)

The environment used for the experiment is Pentium (IV
3GH) processor, 512 MB RAM, running window XP (SP2)
based multiclass SVMlight [15]. We have implemented
Cauchy[22] and ANOVA[21] kernel functions. For Cauchy
and ANOVA kernels, the accuracy for all the three MSVM
methods was very low. We exclude the results for these. The
experiment using RBF[16][17][18] kernel function for
intrusion detection (multiclass classification) with parameters
as g=0.001, c=1, q=50, n=40 gave the intrusion detection rate

In a multiclass prediction, the result on a test set is often
displayed as a two dimensional confusion matrix with a row
and column for each class. Each metrics element shows the
number of test examples for which the actual class is the row
and the predicted class is the column. Good results correspond
to large numbers down the main diagonal and small, ideally
zero, off-diagonal elements
TABLE II.

CONFUSION MATRICS
Predicted Class
Yes

No

Yes

True Positive

False Negative

No

False Positive

True Negative

Actual Class
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VI.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
[8]

There are many kernel functions which can be used in MSVM
for anomaly detection in the IDS. Among those we have
implemented Cauchy and ANOVA kernel functions. We
performed experiment using Cauchy, ANOVA and RBF kernel
function over three types of MSVM and found that the RBF
kernel function gives better performance in the MSVM for
anomaly detection. The intrusion detection rate is 92.05%,
90.65% & 92.00% for one-vs.-one, one-vs.-many & ECOC
methods respectively using RBF kernel function. This result
can further be improved by using composite (combine two
kernel function) of two or more kernel functions.

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]
[14]
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